We study a DeGroot-like opinion dynamics model in which agents may oppose other agents. As an underlying motivation, in our setup, agents want to adjust their opinions to match those of the agents of their 'in-group' and, in addition, they want to adjust their opinions to match the 'inverse' of those of the agents of their 'out-group'. Our paradigm can account for persistent disagreement in connected societies as well as bi-and multi-polarization. Outcomes depend upon network structure and the choice of deviation function modeling the mode of opposition between agents. For a particular choice of deviation function, which we call soft opposition, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for long-run polarization. We also consider social influence (who are the opinion leaders in the network?) as well as the question of wisdom in our naïve learning paradigm, finding that wisdom is difficult to attain when there exist sufficiently strong negative relations between agents.
may be considered an autarky condition. Multiple stubborn agents with distinct opinions on a certain agenda may then draw society toward distinct opinion clusters. Such stubborn agents, it is argued, may appear in the form of opinion leaders, (propaganda) media, or political parties that wish to influence others without receiving any feedback from them. As a solution to the disagreement problem, however, both of these model types rely on a problematic 'disconnectedness condition', insofar as disagreement only obtains when there is no (uni-or bilateral) information flow between certain subclasses of agents.
In this work, we investigate an alternative explanation of disagreement, which can also explain disagreement in connected societies. We consider a non-Bayesian DeGroot-like opinion dynamics model in which agents are related to each other via two types of links. One link type represents the degree or intensity of relationship between agents and is given by nonnegative real numbers. The other link type represents whether agents follow or oppose (deviate from) each other, that is, it represents the kind of relationship between agents. We assume that group identity causes agents to follow their in-group members and to deviate from their out-group members. In-group favoritism and out-group discrimination are important and well-established notions in social psychology (see, for instance, Tajfel Tsutsui and Zizzo, 2014) . Experimentally, it has been shown that even minimal group identities, induced by a random labeling of groups, may lead to intergroup discrimination. When group membership is more salient, Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) show that there is much more cooperation between in-group members than between out-group members in a prisoner's dilemma game, and Fehrler and Kosfeld (2013) show that individuals associating with particular NGOs (non-governmental organizations) strongly discriminate against out-group members (those that do not associate with an NGO) in a trust game. 5 Analogously, we assume that agents want to coordinate with their in-group members (have negative utility from holding different opinions than in-group members) and want to anti-coordinate with their out-group members (have negative utility from not deviating from the opinions that their out-group members hold). 6 A special case of our model is when an agent opposes everyone but himself, i.e., his in-group is himself and his out-group is all 'the rest'. In some works, such agents have been referred to as rebels or anti-conformists in contrast to conformists (2015)). There, the standard assumption is that agents learn from others in a naïve manner, not properly accounting for the repetition of opinion signals, which DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) call 'persuasion bias'. A now classical argument is that if all agents' initial beliefs/opinions were independent and unbiased estimates of the true value (of a discussion topic), then taking a weighted average of the agents' beliefs in one's social network (where the weights are proportional to the inverses of the beliefs' variances) is an optimal aggregation strategy. Then, continuing to average -in order to incorporate more remote information, e.g., from friends of friends -in the same manner is a boundedly rational heuristic that treats the evolving information signals as novel, not accounting for their cross-contamination. Such a heuristic aggregation of opinion signals appears quite plausible given the processing costs involved in exact inference in this setup (cf. Golub and Jackson, 2010) . Also, recent experimental evaluations find that the naïve DeGroot model is a much better approximation of information aggregation in network interactions than 'fully rational' Bayesian approaches and that individuals are indeed affected by persuasion bias (Corazzini et al., 2012 ). In our model, we posit that agents are subject to the same biases involving processing of crosscontaminated information and are, in addition, susceptible to in-group bias, attempting to coordinate 5 In a 'field' setting, the in-group/out-group distinction may prominently be seen as arising, e.g., in a (main stream) culture/counterculture (e.g., hippies, punks, etc.) dichotomy (Yinger, 1977) or in classical party divisions (e.g., Republicans vs. Democrats) in the field of politics, etc.
6 Out-group discrimination (opposition) is also closely related to what has been termed rejection of beliefs, actions, and values of dissimilar/disliked others. According to this concept, agents change their normative systems to become more dissimilar to interaction partners they dislike (cf. Abelson, 1964; Kitts, 2006; Tsuji, 2002 ; cf. also Groeber, Lorenz, and Schweitzer, 2013) insofar as disliked others may serve as 'negative referents' who inspire contrary behavior. While in controlled experiments Takács, Flache, and Mäs (2014) do not find strong evidence for the tenet that individuals disassociate from the opinions of a disliked source, their study explicitly excludes a group identity structure. Moreover, as the authors argue, their laboratory experiment may have "suppressed the emotional processes that in field settings induce disliking and rejection of others' opinions." with in-group members and to anti-coordinate with out-group members.
7
This work is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and gives two introductory examples. Sections 3 and 4 present our main results, on persistent disagreement (Theorem 3.1) and bi-and multi-polarization (Proposition 3.1). For a special case of our model, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for long-run polarization (Theorem 4.1) as well as opinion leadership (Theorem 4.2) as further main results. In Section 5, we summarize and conclude with a discussion on wisdom. To make this work more or less self-contained, we provide concepts, e.g., from graph and matrix theory in the appendix, to which we also relegate all our proofs.
Model
Let S be a finite set ('discrete model') or a subset of the real numbers ('continuous model'), which we refer to as opinion spectrum. 8 Let n ≥ 1 and let [n] = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n agents. Consider the normal form game ([n], S 1 × · · · × S n , U ), where
is the set of players,
• S = S 1 = · · · = S n is the action set of each player,
• and U = (u 1 , . . . , u n ), where u i : S n → R is the payoff/utility function of player i ∈ [n].
Let F be the identity function on S and let D be a function D : S → S that is not the identity function (in the most general form of our model, we subscript D as in D ij ). We assume that agents are connected via a (social) network W, where W ij ≥ 0 denotes the strength of relationship between agents i and j.
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Assume that W ii = 0 and n j=1 W ij = 1, for all i = 1, . . . , n. 10 Assume further that player i has payoff for action profile (b 1 , . . . , b n )
for the continuous model, or, for the discrete model,
Here, In(i) ⊆ [n] is the in-group (set of friends) of player i and Out(i) ⊆ [n] is the out-group (set of enemies) of player i. Utility functions u i in Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (2.2) say that player i has disutility from choosing a different action than his friends and has disutility from choosing a different action than the 'opposite' action of his enemies (where D specifies what the opposite of an action is). When each agent repeatedly plays a best response to the actions of the other players, i.e., i ∈ [n] chooses action b i that maximizes u i (·), then actions evolve in the continuous model according to, for t = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
starting from some particular initial actions b i (0), and according to
4)
7 If one wanted to construct an argument that closely follows that of DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003), one might posit that, in our model, agents 'correct' their out-group members' opinion signals -possibly because of distrust -before averaging. 8 For the continous DeGroot model as we discuss, S is typically modeled as a convex subset of the real numbers, that is, j α j x j ∈ S for all finite numbers of elements x j ∈ S and all weights α j ∈ [0, 1] such that j α j = 1. For convenience, we think of S as the whole of R or of some (closed and bounded) interval [α, β] for α ≤ β. 9 Throughout, we denote the entries of a vector u as u i or [u] i and analogously for matrices. 10 The assumption W ii = 0 can be relaxed, see Groeber, Lorenz, and Schweitzer (2013) . In subsequent sections, we do not always assume that W ii = 0. in the discrete model, where F ij ∈ {F, D}, depending on whether j is in i's in-group or out-group, respectively. Here, ½(r, t) = 1 if r = t and zero otherwise. Casting the updating process (2.3) in a more compact 'operator' notation, we write (F being the n × n 'matrix' with entries F ij )
Here, we let the 'operator' W ⊙ F act on a vector b ∈ S n in the manner prescribed in (2.3) or (2.4), i.e.,
or analogously for the discrete model. 11 Equation (2.5) may again be rewritten as,
by which we denote the t-fold application of operator
In the sequel, we refer to W ⊙ F as 'operator' or 'social network'.
Remark 2.1. In case F is the n × n matrix of identity functions, updating process (2.6) collapses to the standard DeGroot learning model where (W ⊙ F) t is simply the t-th matrix power of matrix W. From an alternative (equivalent) viewpoint, our model generalizes the standard DeGroot model insofar as the latter posits that Out(i) = ∅ for all i ∈ [n].
We note that since the operator W ⊙ F in opinion updating process (2.5) retrieves best responses of agents to an opinion profile b(t), under utility functions u i (·) as in (2.1) or (2.2), the fixed-points of W ⊙ F -that is, the points b such that (W ⊙ F)(b) = b -are the Nash equilibria of the normal form games ([n], S n , U (·)). Namely, for each such a fixed-point, all players in [n] play best responses to the other players' actions (opinions).
We now illustrate our model with two examples, outlining its relationship to other models discussed in the literature and hinting at its potential for long-run disagreement.
Example 2.1. Let S = {0, 1} be a binary opinion space. Assume that
where N (i) denotes the set of neighbors of agent i in the social networks, i.e., the set of agents j for which W ij > 0. When F ij = F for all j ∈ [n], and agent i updates opinions according to (2.4) , then, at each time step, agent i chooses the majority opinion among his neighbors' opinions. Such individuals have also been called 'conformists' in some contexts; e.g., Jackson (2009); Cao et al. (2011) ; Javarone (2014); Jarman et al. (2015) . Conversely, when F ij = D for all j ∈ [n], and agent i updates opinions according to (2.4) , then, at each time step, agent i chooses the minority opinion (= majority of inverted opinions) among his neighbors' opinions. Such individuals have also been called 'anti-conformists' or 'rebels'. When weights are non-uniform and/or agents follow some of their peers while deviating from others, then the current setup may yield interesting generalizations of the basic conformist/non-conformist model.
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Example 2.2. In this example, we let S = [−1, 1] and think of the opinion x = −1 as extreme left-wing opinion, x = +1 as extreme right-wing opinion and of opinions −1 < x < 1 as more moderate opinions (x = 0 as 'center' opinion). Assume there are six individuals, organized in four groups A, B, C, D, 11 For short, we will usually write (W ⊙ F)b instead of (W ⊙ F)(b). 12 It is also worthy to note that binary opinion spaces (in a conformist/anti-conformist setup) are closely related to games on networks (cf. Jackson, 2009 and references therein) with binary action spaces. In a society with only anti-conformists on simple graphs (undirected graphs with no self-loops), maximally independent sets S ⊆ [n] of agents for which it holds that W i,S = j∈S W ij > 1/2 for all i ∈ [n]\S form pure strategy Nash equilibria of the underlying games in the sense that assigning one action/opinion to all agents in S and the complementary action/opinion to all agents in [n]\S constitutes a setting where each agent plays a best response to the actions/opinions of the others. In a society with both conformists and anti-conformists, (pure strategy) Nash equilibria exist on networks in which each agent assigns weight mass > 1/2 to conformists: an equilibrium is where all the conformists take one action (hold one opinion), and all the anti-conformists the other (cf. Jackson, 2009, p.272). 
for all x ∈ [−1, 1]. Put differently, agents in group A ignore the actual opinion signals of members of their out-groups, simply interpreting any uttered opinion of an out-group individual as evidence of the opinion 1. Similarly, agents in group B interpret any opinion signal uttered by an out-group agent as evidence for opinion −1. Agents in group C are moderate in that they 'discount' (extreme) viewpoints that their out-group members hold. Finally, agents in group D more literally invert the opinions of members of (their out-)groups A and B -possibly knowing of these agents' predispositions for extreme opinions of particular kinds. Moreover, they map the opinions of members of (their out-)group C to more extreme opinions for any value of x between −1 and 1 -possibly knowing of these agents' biases toward moderate opinions. According to this specification, matrix F looks as follows:
In Figure 1 , we plot sample opinion dynamics when agents start with the initial consensus b(0) = (µ, . . . , µ)
⊺ , where µ = 1/4, and for an arbitrarily selected positive row-stochastic matrix W ∈ R 6×6 . Note how, in this case, agents' opinions polarize into extreme and moderate viewpoints and note how the opinion dynamics process (apparently) converges and stabilizes as time progresses. In the same figure, we also sketch the deviation functions defined in Equation (2.7). 
Persistent disagreement, bi-and multipolarization
In this section, we consider our extended DeGroot model in the abstract situation of arbitrary deviation functions D. Our results in this context concern the possible consensus opinions that agents may hold in our model in the long-run (Theorem 3.1). We will find that the long-run consensus vectors can be determined quite simply: under appropriate weight conditions, a certain consensus opinion vector (c, . . . , c) is an equilibrium if and only if c is a (D-)neutral opinion with respect to each agent's deviation function D, i.e., D maps the opinion c to itself. This is our persistent disagreement result: as long as there exist (sufficiently strong) out-group relations between agents, society will disagree forever if there is no opinion which is neutral for everyone, no matter the agents' initial opinions. After investigating long-run persisent disagreement, we consider a particular form of disagreement, namely, bi-and multi-polarization (for abstract and arbitrary deviation functions D).
To begin with our formal analysis, we define a few concepts. Let C be the set of consensus opinion vectors in S n , i.e.,
Let Y be an arbitrary set and let Q be an arbitrary function Q : Y → Y . By Fix(Q), we denote the set of fixed-points of Q, that is, the set of all
be an arbitrary subset of the set of agents and let i ∈ [n] be a particular agent. We denote by W i,A := j∈A W ij the total weight mass i assigns to group A.
Assume that either W ⊙ F refers to the discrete model or that each function
} denote the set of agents whose weight mass assigned to out-group members exceeds a particular threshold C 0 ; in the discrete case, C 0 = 1 2 , and in the continuous case, C 0 = 0. Then:
where
, for some b(0) ∈ S n } denotes the set of opinion profiles b ∈ S n that may result in the limit of opinion updating process (2.6). Moreover, P 1 projects consensus vectors (c, . . . , c) ∈ S n on their first coordinate c ∈ S. If A is the empty set, we let
One of the implications of Theorem 3.1 is persistent disagreement, under rather mild conditions and the assumptions of the theorem, as a prediction of our generalized DeGroot updating process (2.6). Namely, in particular, the relation i∈A Fix(D i ) = ∅ follows when, for instance:
• Two agents' assessment of what constitutes a neutral opinion differs:
More generally, persistent disagreement follows whenever the agents in society have no common interpretation of neutrality: there exists no opinion c ∈ S such that c is D i -neutral for all agents i.
Example 3.1. We apply Theorem 3.1 to the examples discussed previously. In Example 2.1, Fix(D) = ∅, so in a conformist/anti-conformist society, consensus cannot ensue if at least one agent opposes more than half of his social network. In Example 2.2, Fix(
. While Theorem 3.1 does not directly apply to Example 2.2, since agent 6's deviation functions vary across out-group agents, we can nonetheless apply the theorem to the society consisting of agents 1 through 5 and conclude that reaching a consensus is not possible for this subsociety since, e.g., ∅ = {1} ∩ {−1} (and assuming that respective weights satisfy the positivity assumption outlined in the theorem). Hence, since agents 1 to 5 cannot reach a consensus, then also agents 1 to 6 -the overall society in the example -cannot reach a consensus.
Polarization
We now investigate (bi-)polarization as an outcome of our opinion updating dynamics. We call an opinion vector p ∈ S n a (bi-)polarization if p consists of two elements a, b ∈ S exclusively, that is, if [p] i ∈ {a, b} for all i = 1, . . . , n. Note that according to our definition, a consensus vector is a special case of a polarization. Next, we define network structures that are sufficient for inducing polarization opinion vectors.
Definition 3.1 (Opposition bipartite operator W ⊙ F). We call the operator W ⊙ F opposition bipartite if there exists a partition (N 1 , N 2 ) of the set of agents [n] into two disjoint subsets -[n] = N 1 ∪ N 2 , with N 1 ∩ N 2 = ∅ -such that agents in N i follow each other, for i = 1, 2, while for all agents i 0 ∈ N i , j 0 ∈ N −i , for i = 1, 2, it holds that i 0 deviates from j 0 . More precisely, we require
Remark 3.1. Note that our above definition of opposition bipartiteness is equivalent to the condition that (1) no two agents within each subsociety are enemies of each other and that (2) no two agents across the two subsocieties are friends of each other.
Also note that we do not necessarily require N 1 and N 2 to be non-empty. Therefore, the standard DeGroot model (with exclusively friendship relationships) constitutes a special case of an opposition bipartite network in which N 1 = [n] and N 2 = ∅. N 2 ) of the set of agents [n] into two disjoint subsets such that agents in N i deviate from each other, for i = 1, 2, while for all agents i 0 ∈ N i , j 0 ∈ N −i , for i = 1, 2, it holds that i 0 follows j 0 . More precisely, we require
An example of an opposition bipartite operator is given in Example 3.2 below. An example of a reverse opposition bipartite operator is given in Example 3.3 below. A schematic illustration of both concepts is given in Figure 2 . Clearly, opposition bipartite networks have polarization opinion vectors as equilibria, when agents in the same group hold one opinion and agents in the alternative group hold the 'opposite' opinion, as we illustrate below. Example 3.2. Let W be arbitrary row-stochastic. Consider
Clearly, W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite; for example, take N 1 = {1, 2} and N 2 = {3, 4}. Moreover, let S = {"impossible","unlikely","possible","likely","certain"} and let, e.g., "unlikely" and "likely" be D-opposing viewpoints, i.e., D(a) = b and D(b) = a for a ="unlikely" and b ="likely". Then
Reverse opposition bipartite networks may induce oscillating, or fluctuating, opinion updates (cf. Kramer, 1971), very similar to ordinary periodic networks.
Example 3.3. Let W be arbitrary row-stochastic. Consider
Clearly, W ⊙ F is reverse opposition bipartite; for example, take N 1 = {1, 2} and N 2 = {3, 4}. For p and D as in Example 3.2, we have
Also, note that in this example self-weights W ii may be zero for all agents i, so that agents do not necessarily have to deviate from their own opinions in order for reverse opposition bipartiteness to be satisfied.
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Next, we turn from bi-polarization to multi-polarization in which an opinion vector p ∈ S n consists of k distinct opinions s 1 , . . . , s k . We generalize our notion of opposition bipartite networks. . . , k, while for all agents i 0 ∈ N i , j 0 ∈ N j with i = j, it holds that i 0 deviates from j 0 . More precisely, we require
We also call an opposition k-partite operator opposition multi-partite.
Opposition multi-partite networks admit multi-polarizations as outcomes, as a simple generalization of Example 3.2. Proposition 3.1. Let W ⊙ F be an opposition k-partite, for k ≥ 2, social network. Moreover, let F be such that F ij ∈ {F, D 1 , . . . , D k } for deviation functions D 1 , . . . , D k that precisely correspond to the k groups society is made up of (that is, agents in group ℓ, for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, apply deviation function D ℓ ). Let s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ S be such that
Then, there exists a multi-polarization opinion vector p consisting of opinions s 1 , . . . , s k , that is, [p] i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s k }, such that (W ⊙ F)p = p. Example 3.4. For a concrete example, let S = {L, M, R} and consider three different groups with distinct deviation functions D 1 (x) = L, D 2 (x) = M , D 3 (x) = R for all x ∈ {L, M, R}. Group 1 may be thought of as always deviating to a left wing opinion, provided that its members deviate from certain agents; group 2 to a moderate position in the opinion spectrum; and group 3 to a right wing position. Let, e.g., n = 6, W be arbitrary row-stochastic, and let
Clearly, W⊙F is opposition 3-partite (see also Figure 3 ). It is easy to check that, e.g.
is a fixed-point of W ⊙ F, in accordance with the proposition. We omit the introduction of reverse opposition k-partite networks, for k ≥ 2, as a straightforward generalization of reverse opposition bipartite networks. The generalization is along the lines of the generalization of opposition k-partite networks over opposition bipartite ones.
Continuous linear deviation functions
We now consider the situation when deviation functions take the affine-linear form
for a, b ∈ R. When deviation functions are of this form and when agents are in addition homogeneous with respect to their deviation functions, i.e., D does not vary across agents, then the operator W ⊙ F admits a particularly simple form, namely, that of an affine-linear operator; see Proposition A.2 in the appendix. Moreover, we consider here the special case when a = −1 and b = 0.
14 We consider such D on opinion spectra S 0 that are either of the form [−β, β] for some β > 0 or of the form S = R. We call this D defined on such opinion spectra soft opposition. 15 In this case, social networks W ⊙ F may be represented by a matrix A that has entries W ij iff j ∈ In(i) and entries −W ij iff j ∈ Out(i).
A graph theoretical description
In the remainder, we consider the situation when graphs (i) contain no self-loops and are undirected (simple) in the sense that W ij = W ji and F ij = F ji , 16 (ii) contain at most one type of deviation function D across all agents, and (iii) when D is linear on the opinion spectrum S 0 ; in particular, D is soft opposition. When networks W ⊙ F are so specified, then, as before, W ⊙ F admits a linear matrix representation A where A is in addition symmetric: A ⊺ = A. We denote this class of networks by SLS(S 0 ) (for S imple, Linear, S oft opposition, and where the argument refers to the opinion spectrum), that is,
denotes the class of social networks on agent sets [n] that satisfy simplicity, symmetricity, etc., as described. We make an additional technical assumption here and in the remainder, namely, we generally assume that the social networks wherein agents interact are aperiodic, that is, the greatest common divisor of the lengths of their simple cycles is 1. Our main theorem in this context exhaustively categorizes long-run opinions in terms of three different social network structures as outlined in the theorem. In the theorem, recall that a graph G is said to be (strongly) connected if there exists a path in G from any node to any other node. Moreover, in the theorem, we say that W ⊙ F is convergent if W ⊙ F is convergent for all initial opinion vectors b(0) ∈ S n , that is, lim t→∞ (W ⊙ F) t b(0) exists for all b(0) ∈ S n . We say that W ⊙ F induces a consensus if W ⊙ F induces a consensus for all initial opinion vectors b(0) ∈ S n , that is, W ⊙ F is convergent and lim t→∞ (W ⊙ F) t b(0) is always a consensus. We say that W ⊙ F is divergent if it is not convergent. In other words, W ⊙ F is divergent when there exists a vector b(0) such that lim t→∞ (W ⊙ F) t b(0) does not exist. We say that W ⊙ F induces a polarization if lim t→∞ (W ⊙ F) t b(0) is a polarization, for all initial opinion vectors b(0). We say that W ⊙ F induces a non-zero polarization when W ⊙ F induces a polarization and lim t→∞ (W ⊙ F) t b(0) = 0 for some initial opinion vectors b(0).
Theorem 4.1. Let W ⊙ F ∈ SLS(S 0 ). Assume that W ⊙ F is strongly connected (since A is symmetric, we might also simply say 'connected') and aperiodic. Then:
(i) W ⊙ F induces a polarization (that is not always zero) if and only if W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite. 15 We call such D soft opposition because opinions are inverted the less strongly the closer they are to the neutral consensus zero. In our working paper version, we also define a (discontinuous) deviation function called hard opposition that maps opinions to extreme inverted values of the opinion spectrum, depending on whether they are positive or negative (depending on which side of the opinion spectrum they lie, with 0 as reference point).
16 This captures reciprocity: amity and enmity are mutual.
(ii) W ⊙ F is divergent if and only if W ⊙ F is reverse opposition bipartite.
(iii) W ⊙ F induces a neutral 17 consensus if and only if W ⊙ F is neither opposition bipartite nor reverse opposition bipartite.
For better understanding, we give alternative characterizations of conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 4.1, which follow from the theorem and its proof. Namely, we find that: The fact that polarization requires 'exact' balance (opposition bipartiteness) and admits not a 'grain of imbalancedness', as stated in Theorem 4.1 and exemplified in Figure 4 , may appear odd since one might expect, in reality, small perturbations to balance -e.g., small-scale intra-group antagonisms or individual friendships among enemies -to be the rule rather than the exception, particularly in large enough systems. We note that this result is closely connected to the continuous opinion spectrum and the corresponding averaging updating that we have considered in this section. If one thinks that reality is better perceived of as discrete, with weighted majority voting as a more plausible opinion updating mechanism, then it is apparent that the discrete model is clearly robust against small perturbations, so that polarizing viewpoints can be Nash equilibria in this case even when the underlying networks exhibit (marginal) imbalancedness.
We also note that our results may be generalized to periodic graphs (those that are not aperiodic) and to graphs that are not connected. We leave this to future work.
Social influence and opinion leadership
In DeGroot learning, one of the important questions has been that of opinion leadership: whose agents' initial opinions have most impact upon resulting limiting (long-run) opinions and how does this depend on the network structure in which the agents are embedded. In the context of connected SLS(S 0 ) networks as we have defined above, this question admits an elegant solution in our extended DeGroot model with in-group/out-group relationships. Namely, if the network is reverse opposition bipartite, the updating operator diverges (for at least some initial opinion vectors) and opinion leadership is thus not well-defined. If, in contrast, the network is opposition bipartite and aperiodic, opinion leadership is determined by eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972) exactly in the same way as in the original DeGroot model, except that a plus or minus sign indicates the group membership of the agents. Finally, if none of those two conditions hold, then no agent is influential, since agents will converge to a fixed-point of the deviation function no matter their initial opinions. The opposition bipartite case is the focus of the next theorem. where g(j) ∈ {±1}.
(ii) W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite.
Since in case of opposition bipartite and aperiodic strongly connected networks there are two long-run opinion values and an agent j's 'influence' on each of them is g(j)s j and −g(j)s j , respectively, where g(j) ∈ {±1}, we may speak of agent j's absolute power |v j | = |g(j)s j | = |−g(j)s j | = s j . Thus, in summary, the last theorem and our previous discussion lead to the following characterization for strongly connected networks W ⊙ F ∈ SLS(S 0 ): (i) Each agent's absolute power |v i | is given by |v i | = s i where s is the unique left unit eigenvector of |A| with normalization i∈[n] s i = 1 if and only if W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite.
(ii) Opinion leadership is not (well-)defined if and only if W ⊙ F is reverse opposition bipartite.
(iii) Each agent's power is given by v i = 0 if and only if W ⊙ F is neither opposition bipartite nor reverse opposition bipartite.
It is noteworthy that in case (i), absolute power is independent of the kinds of relationships between agents and only depends on their intensities. In other words, an agent may also be prominent when she attracts strong negative links. When society partitions into several subsocities, these results may be applied independently to each of them.
Concluding remarks
Opinions are important in an economic context (and other contexts) since they shape the demand for products, set the political course, and guide, in general, socio-economic behavior. Models of opinion dynamics describe how individuals form opinions or beliefs about an underlying state or a discussion topic. Typically, in the social networks literature, subjects may communicate with other individuals, their peers, in this context, enabling them to aggregate dispersed information. Bayesian models of opinion formation assume that agents form their opinions in a fully rational manner and have an accurate 'model of the world' at their disposal, both of which are questionable and unrealistic assumptions for actual social learning processes of human individuals. Non-Bayesian models, and most prominently the classical DeGroot model of opinion formation, while also not unproblematic (cf. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2011), posit that agents employ simple 'rule-of-thumb' heuristics to integrate the opinions of others. Unfortunately, both the non-Bayesian and Bayesian paradigms typically lead individuals to a consensus, which apparently contradicts the facts as people disagree with others on many issues of (everyday) life. In the context of DeGroot learning models, some approaches can address this, either by assuming a homophily principle whereby agents limit their communication to those who hold similar opinions as themselves or by introducing stubborn agents, modeling, e.g., opinion leaders, who never update their opinions. Both approaches are, again, debatable since they assume a complete lack of flow of information between some classes of agents (from some time onwards). In addition, models based on homophily and stubborn agents both ignore negative relationships between individuals as potential sources for conflict and disagreement.
In the current work, we have investigated opinion dynamics under out-group discrimination (in-group bias) as such a potentially alternative explanation for disagreement. In our setup, agents are driven by two forces: they want to adjust their opinions to match those of the agents of their in-group and, in addition, they want to adjust their opinions to match the 'inverse' of those of the agents of their out-group. Best responses in this setting lead us to a DeGroot-like opinion updating process in which agents form their next period opinions via weighted averages of their neighbors' (possibly inverted) opinion signals. Unlike in the standard DeGroot model where opinions may converge to arbitrary consensus opinion profiles, in our model only neutral consensus opinion profiles may be attained in the long-run, that is, consensus vectors where the consensus opinion is a fixed-point of each agent's deviation function (modeling the mode of opposition between agents). Thus, if there exists no opinion that is 'globally' neutral in this sense, our model predicts persistent disagreement provided that negative relations between agents are sufficiently strong. When we specialize our model to undirected networks containing no self-loops and where the only allowable deviation function is 'soft opposition', we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for bi-polarization in connected societies. These say that long-run opinions bi-polarize if and only if the underlying network wherein agents communicate satisfies 'opposition bipartiteness': it consists of two groups of agents exhibiting positive within-group links and negative between-group links. We also investigate social influence in this special case, that is, the question of whose initial opinions matter most for resulting long-run opinions. We find that in opposition bipartite networks (satisfying aperiodicity), opinion leadership is determined by eigenvector centrality exactly in the same way as in the standard DeGroot model, except that a plus or minus sign indicates group membership. This means that an agent is prominent to the degree that she is interlinked with prominent agents; it is noteworthy that even strong negative ties increase prominence.
Finally, considering the question of wisdom (Golub and Jackson, 2010; Jadbabaie et al., 2012; Buechel, Hellmann, and Klößner, 2015) , that is, whether agents can (jointly) learn the true state of nature of their discussion topic, provided that such a truth exists, we observe the following. The case for wisdom is a weak one in our model since negative ties typically prevent consensus formation, so clearly not everybody can be wise in the long-run. This holds even when agents are initially perfectly informed in the sense that their initial beliefs coincide with truth. In particular, if agents (multi-)polarize, then at most one group of agents may be wise in the long-run, but due to the mutual dependence of long-run beliefs, we might suspect none to be. 18 Ultimately, this result must be interpreted by reference to the rationality of the agents involved. The standard interpretation of DeGroot learners is that of naïve individuals susceptible to persuasion bias. Golub and Jackson (2010) show that such agents can still learn the true state of nature under not too demanding conditions. Jadbabaie et al. (2012) show that slightly more rationality increases the case for wisdom. In contrast, we show that an additional bias such as in-group bias may significantly worsen this case.
Concerning future research directions within our context, both weight links and opposition links between agents, W and F, have been assumed exogenous in the current work. Prospectively, it might be worthwhile to consider endogenous link formation processes. In particular, the origin and evolution of out-group relations, and their interdependence with agents' opinions and external factors, such as, most importantly, external truth, might be of interest. Definition A.2. A walk in a network G = (V, E) is a sequence of nodes i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i K , not necessarily distinct, such that (i k , i k+1 ) ∈ E for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}. A path is a walk consisting of distinct nodes. A cycle is a walk i 1 , . . . , i K such that i 1 = i K . The length of cylce i 1 , . . . , i K is defined to be K − 1. A cycle is called simple if the only node appearing twice is i 1 = i K .
Remark A.1. We use the same terminology -'strongly connected', 'aperiodic', etc. -whether we speak of (our) multigraphs, in which there exist exactly two types of relationships between agents, or ordinary graphs. In the case of multigraphs, we refer to their underlying ordinary graphs. We also use the same terminology for n × n matrices A and their underlying graphs ([n], {(i, j) | A ij = 0}).
A.2 Matrix and Markov chain theory
We first state one of the main theorems for the DeGroot updates (2.6) in the non-opposition case (cf. Golub and Jackson (2010) ). We assume that W is row-stochastic.
Theorem A.1. Consider the opinion updating process (2.6) with F ij = F for all i, j ∈ [n], where F is the identity function. Let the multigraph corresponding to the operator W ⊙ F = W -an ordinary graph -be strongly connected and aperiodic. Then W ⊙ F is convergent and induces a consensus.
In case W ⊙ F is an affine-linear map, whether or not W ⊙ F converges can be fully determined by reference the notion of eigenvalues, which we introduce now.
n×n be an n × n matrix. An eigenvalue of A is any value λ ∈ C such that Ax = λx for some non-zero vector x ∈ R n . The set of distinct eigenvalues of matrix A is called its spectrum and denoted by σ(A). By ρ(A), we denote the spectral radius of A, the largest absolute value of all the eigenvalues of A, that is, ρ(A) = max{ λ | λ ∈ σ(A)}. where an eigenvalue is called semisimple if its algebraic multiplicity equals its geometric multiplicity. The algebraic multiplicity of an eigenvalue λ is the number of times it is repeated as a root of the characteristic polynomial χ(λ) = det (A − λI n ), where I n is the n × n identity matrix. The geometric multiplicity is the number of linearly independent eigenvectors associated with λ.
A.3 Signed networks
Here, we assume social networks W ⊙ F such that F ij ∈ {F, D} where D is soft opposition on S 0 , i.e., D(x) = −x. Such operators admit a matrix representation A in which each entry has a positive or negative sign (or is zero), see Proposition A.2. We assume that A is connected and aperiodic. 
A.4 Proofs of main results
Proposition A.1. Let W ⊙ F be an arbitrary social network such that
Moreover, let A = {i ∈ [n] | W i,Out(i) > C 0 } denote the set of agents whose weight mass assigned to out-group members exceeds a particular threshold C 0 ; in the discrete case, C 0 = 1 2 , and in the continuous case, C 0 = 0. Then, for any i ∈ A, it holds that c / ∈ Fix(D i ) =⇒ (c, . . . , c) / ∈ Fix(W ⊙ F).
Combining both implications yields that
Remark A.2. If D is allowed to vary across both i and j, then c / ∈ Fix(D ij ) does not necessarily imply that (c, . . . , c) / ∈ Fix(W ⊙ F). To see this, assume, for example, that in a three-player society {1, 2, 3} agent 1 has Out(1) = {2, 3} with W 12 = W 13 = (aW ij )x j + bW i,Out(i) .
Thus, we can set A ∈ R n×n , d ∈ R n with
Lemma A.5. Let W ⊙ F be an arbitrary social network with F ij ∈ {F, D} for an arbitrary deviation function D. Then, W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite if and only if W ⊙F is reverse opposition bipartite, whereF is the matrix with entriesF ij = ¬F ij , whereby we define ¬D = F and ¬F = D.
Proof. See Figure 2 , in Section 3, for a graphical proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. (i) =⇒ (ii):
For an appropriate initial opinion vector, let each agent hold limiting opinions a = 0 or −a as indicated. Place agents in a group N 1 resp. N 2 depending on whether they hold limit opinions a or −a, respectively. We show that (N 1 , N 2 ) forms an opposition bipartite partition of [n] . Take i, i ′ ∈ N 1 and assume that A ii ′ < 0 (i.e., i and i ′ are enemies). Then, since the limit opinion vector is a fixed-point of A a(±A i1 + · · · + A ii ′ + · · · + ±A in ) = a.
But this cannot be, since A ii ′ + C < |A ii ′ | + C ′ = 1 where C = j =i ′ ±A ij and C ′ = j =i ′ |A ij |. Similarly, we can show that no two agents i ∈ N 1 , j ∈ N 2 are friends of each other. Hence, W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite.
(ii) =⇒ (i): Conversely, let W ⊙ F be opposition bipartite and aperiodic. By Lemma A.1, W ⊙ F is opposition bipartite if and only if there exists a diagonal matrix ∆ (with entries ±1) such that |A| = ∆A∆. We know that This proves the theorem.
